Case No. VSO-0168, 26 DOE ¶ 82,803 (H.O. Augustyn December 9, 1997)

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* The original of this document contains information which is subject to withholding from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 552. Such material has been deleted from this copy and replaced with XXXXXXX’s.

December 9, 1997

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

Hearing Officer's Opinion

Name of Case:Personnel Security Hearing

Date of Filing:July 25, 1997

Case Number: VSO-0168

This Opinion concerns the eligibility of XXXXXXXXXXXXXX (the individual) for restoration of his access authorization(1) under the regulations set forth at 10 C.F.R. Part 710, entitled "Criteria for Access to Classified Matter or Special Nuclear Material." As discussed below, after carefully considering the record before me in light of the relevant regulations, I recommend against restoring the individual’s access authorization.

I. Background

The individual has held an access authorization throughout his 19-year term of employment with various contractors at a DOE facility. In early January 1997, the individual reported to his employer that he had been arrested for “Driving While Intoxicated” (DWI). This revelation prompted the DOE to conduct a Personnel Security Interview (PSI) to obtain information regarding the circumstances surrounding the DWI arrest and the extent of the individual’s alcohol use. After the PSI, the DOE referred the individual to a board-certified psychiatrist (DOE consultant-psychiatrist) for a mental evaluation. The DOE consultant-psychiatrist examined the individual on April 4, 1997, and memorialized his findings in a report dated April 24, 1997 (Psychiatric Report or Exhibit 23). In the Psychiatric Report, the DOE consultant-psychiatrist opined that the individual suffers from alcohol abuse and does not present evidence of adequate rehabilitation or reformation. Since information creating doubt as to the individual’s eligibility for a security clearance remained unresolved after the mental evaluation, the DOE suspended the individual’s security clearance and obtained authority from the Director of the Office of Safeguards and Security to initiate this administrative review proceeding.

On June 11, 1997, the DOE issued a Notification Letter to the individual which identified the individual’s alcohol use as derogatory information that cast doubt on his continued eligibility for access authorization. According to the DOE, the derogatory information fell within the purview of

10 C.F.R. § 710.8(j) (Criterion J).(2) Among the allegations cited in the Notification Letter regarding the individual’s alcohol use are the following:

On July 14, 1997, the individual filed a response to the allegations contained in the Notification Letter together with a request for a hearing regarding those allegations. The DOE transmitted the individual's hearing request to the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) Director pursuant to the provisions of 10 C.F.R. § 710.25(a) on July 25, 1997. The OHA Director appointed me as Hearing Officer in this case on July 30, 1997. 10 C.F.R. § 710.25(b). I convened a hearing in this matter within the time frame prescribed by the regulations governing the administrative hearing process. See 10 C.F.R. § 710.25(g). At the hearing, the DOE called four witnesses: the individual, a DOE personnel security specialist, the DOE consultant-psychiatrist, and a DOE contractor management official. The individual offered the testimony of five witnesses: his psychotherapist, a neighbor, his supervisor, his live-in girlfriend, and a licensed mental health counselor. Eight days later, the individual presented testimony via telephone of his internist who was unable to appear in person at the hearing. On November 12, 1997, I received the hearing transcript at which time I closed the record in this case. See 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(e).

II. Standard of Review

The applicable regulations state that “[t]he decision as to access authorization is a comprehensive, common-sense judgment, made after consideration of all the relevant information, favorable or unfavorable, as to whether the granting of access authorization would not endanger the common defense and security and would be clearly consistent with the national interest.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(a). In resolving questions about the individual's access authorization, I must consider the relevant factors and circumstances connected with the individual’s conduct. These factors are set out in § 710.7(c):

the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct, the circumstances surrounding his conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; the frequency and recency of his conduct; the age and maturity at the time of the conduct; the voluntariness of his participation; the absence or presence of rehabilitation or reformation and other pertinent behavioral changes; the motivation for his conduct; the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress, the likelihood of continuation or recurrence; and other relevant and material factors.

A DOE administrative proceeding under 10 C.F.R. Part 710 is not a criminal proceeding in which the burden is on the government to prove the individual guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Personnel Security Hearing, Case No. VSO-0078, 25 DOE ¶ 82,202 (1996), aff’d, Case No. VSA-0078, 25 DOE ¶ 83,016 (1996) (affirmed by OSA, 1996). A hearing is “for the purpose of affording the individual an opportunity of supporting his eligibility for access authorization.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.21(b)(6). Once the DOE has made a showing of derogatory information raising security concerns, the burden is on the individual to come forward at the hearing with evidence to convince the DOE that restoring his access authorization “would not endanger the common defense and security and would be clearly consistent with the national interest.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(d). See Personnel Security Hearing, Case No. VSO-0013, 24 DOE ¶ 82,752 at 85,511 (1995) (affirmed by OSA, 1996), and cases cited therein. This standard implies that there is a strong presumption against the granting or restoring of a security clearance. See Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988) (“clearly consistent with the national interest” standard for the granting of security clearances indicates “that security determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials”); Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991) (strong presumption against the issuance of a security clearance). For the reasons discussed below, I find that the individual has not met his burden in this case.

III. Findings of Fact

The relevant facts in this case are largely uncontested. The individual acknowledges that he has been consuming alcohol in varying quantities for 30 years. See Exhibit 4 at 24. According to the record, the individual began drinking alcohol as an adolescent, with a period of heavy drinking during college. Transcript of xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Hearing (Tr.) at 107. At some point, the individual settled into a pattern of a couple of beers or a shot of whiskey every night. Exhibit 7 at 36; Tr. at 108. The individual acknowledges that his drinking got “out of hand” in the early 1980s, and that he began to abuse alcohol. Exhibit 7 at 34. During this time, the individual sought counseling for problems related to his marriage and his drinking. Exhibit 6 at 11-17. The counselor suggested that he attend Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and stop consuming alcohol completely. Id. at 16; Exhibit 7 at 41. The individual did not abstain from alcohol and attended only four or five AA meetings. Id. at 41-42.

Eventually the individual divorced his wife. The individual confesses that prior to his divorce he was imbibing to the point of intoxication two to three times each week, and reported to work suffering from a hangover as often as twice per week. Exhibit 6 at 14, 30-31; Exhibit 7 at 34. The individual also admitted that alcohol may have been one factor, among others, that led to marital discord with his wife. Exhibit 7 at 40; Tr. at 48. He acknowledged that his wife had asked him to curb or cease his alcohol consumption because it was negatively impacting their home life. Exhibit 6 at 18.

A few years later in 1986, the DOE inquired during a PSI about the individual’s drinking habits at the time. Exhibit 7. The individual attested that during 1986, he drank to the point of intoxication ten times. Id. at 38-39. He defined intoxication as the consumption of one pint of whiskey or two or three six-packs of beer. Id.

Late one evening in early January 1997,(3) the individual admits that he consumed two beers before setting out to drive two friends to their homes. Tr. at 30. Enroute, he encountered an accident scene. While attempting to reverse directions at the scene, the individual was stopped by the State Police. The police ordered the individual to take a field sobriety test, apparently after detecting the odor of alcohol in the car. Exhibit 23 at 2. The individual failed the field sobriety test. (4) As a result, the individual was arrested and transported to jail where he refused to submit to a blood alcohol test. Tr. at 65-66; Exhibit 23 at 2. The individual was nonetheless charged with DWI, and released after posting bond. According to the individual, the DWI charge was subsequently dismissed on a technicality, i.e., the arresting officer misstated the date of the incident. Tr. at 29-30; 67. The individual claims that he has not consumed any alcohol since his DWI arrest in January 1997. Exhibit 4 at 21; Tr. at 30.

Three months after the DWI arrest, the DOE consultant-psychiatrist evaluated the individual and diagnosed him as suffering from alcohol abuse as that term is defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV (DSM-IV), published by the American Psychiatric Association. See Exhibit 23. In the Psychiatric Report, the DOE consultant-psychiatrist opined that the individual had not shown adequate evidence of rehabilitation or reformation from his alcohol abuse as of that date. Id. The DOE consultant-psychiatrist recommended that the individual enter an intensive outpatient treatment program for a few weeks to deal with his high level of denial. This treatment, according to the DOE consultant-psychiatrist, should be followed by ongoing intensive work such as ninety AA meetings in ninety days. It was the DOE consultant-psychiatrist’s opinion that the individual would need one or two years of treatment before he would achieve rehabilitation or reformation.

Finally, according to the record, the individual has had a nine-year history of mild elevation of his liver transaminase. Exhibit BB. Medical tests conducted this year on the individual confirm that the individual has chronic persistent Hepatitis C. Id.; Tr. at 199-200. The individual’s internist testified that the liver abnormalities are not consistent with alcohol abuse. Id. at 197. He explained that in patients where there is alcohol abuse the SGOT liver enzyme level is usually higher than the SGPT liver enzyme level. In the individual’s case, the opposite is revealed by the laboratory tests. Id.

IV. Analysis

I have thoroughly considered the record of this proceeding, including the submissions tendered in this case and the testimony of the witnesses presented at the hearing. In resolving the question of the individual’s eligibility for access authorization, I have been guided by the applicable factors prescribed in 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(c). After due deliberation, it is my opinion that the individual’s access authorization should not be restored. I cannot find that such restoration would not endanger the common defense and security and would be clearly consistent with the national interest. 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(a). The specific findings I make in support of this recommendation are discussed below.

A. Derogatory Information

The weight of the evidence in this case indicates that the DOE properly relied on Criterion J as a basis for suspending the individual’s access authorization. Specifically, the individual readily admits that he was an alcoholic in the 1980s when he was unable to control his drinking habits. Exhibit 7 at 16. Furthermore, he does not dispute that he sought counseling in the 1980s for his alcohol problem and failed to heed the counselors’ advice to abstain from drinking alcohol and to attend AA. In addition, he reluctantly conceded at the hearing that he is a recovering alcoholic today. Tr. at 74. Finally, a board-certified psychiatrist evaluated the individual, administered psychological tests to him, and diagnosed him as currently suffering from alcohol abuse. (5)

In determining that there was sufficient derogatory information regarding the individual’s alcohol use to rise to the level of a legitimate security concern, I considered other evidence introduced into the record by the individual to refute the allegations contained in the Notification Letter. First, the individual suggests that I disregard the 1997 DWI arrest because the charge was dismissed. I reject the individual’s suggestion. My role is to evaluate all the available information regarding the individual’s use of alcohol rather than to focus solely on the outcome of a legal proceeding. In this case, the dismissal of the DWI charge on technical grounds does not prevent me from considering the individual’s admission that he consumed two beers immediately before he drove his vehicle on the night in question and that he failed a field sobriety test.

Regarding the individual’s elevated liver enzyme levels, it now appears that the individual’s abnormal liver function tests were most probably caused by chronic persistent Hepatitis C. See Exhibit BB. The individual’s recent diagnosis of Hepatitis C casts a shadow on the allegation in the Notification Letter linking the individual’s alcohol use to his elevated liver enzymes. Notwithstanding the new evidence regarding the individual’s Hepatitis C, I find that the totality of the other evidence in the record convinces me that the individual’s prior alcohol use is significant enough to create a security concern.(6)

A finding of derogatory information does not, however, end the evaluation of the evidence concerning the individual’s eligibility for access authorization. See Personnel Security Hearing, Case No. VSO- 0154, 26 DOE ¶ 82,794 (1997), appeal filed. In this case, the individual suggests that his efforts to maintain sobriety during the nine months preceding the hearing and his exemplary job performance should mitigate the security concerns associated with his past abuse of alcohol. I will address the mitigating circumstances the individual has advanced in turn.

B. Mitigating Factors

1. Rehabilitation

The individual asserts that he has not consumed any alcohol since January 1997. Tr. at 30. At the hearing, the individual’s girlfriend with whom he has lived for nine years and a neighbor testified that neither has seen him drink since January 1997. Id. at 92, 180. The individual also advises that he has attended weekly counseling sessions with a psychotherapist since May 1997 to address personal issues including his abuse of alcohol. In addition, he has sought assistance in August 1997 from a licensed mental health counselor through his employer’s Employee Assistance Program.

At the hearing, the individual presented the testimony of both his psychotherapist and licensed mental health counselor. His psychotherapist opined that the individual has the motivation and capacity to maintain abstinence and believes him to be a good candidate for maintaining sobriety. Id. at 104. When queried how long he anticipated the individual should remain in counseling with him, the psychotherapist replied, “another nine months.” Id. at 111. The licensed mental health counselor has seen the individual only four times since August 1997. He testified that he had read the Psychiatric Report and concurred with the DOE consultant-psychiatrist’s diagnosis of alcohol abuse. Tr. at 162. He asserts, however, that he believes the individual is in remission and has “spontaneously recovered” from his abuse of alcohol. Exhibit D; Tr. at 165. Moreover, it is the licensed mental health counselor’s view that the individual will remain sober in the future. Id. Under questioning, the licensed mental health counselor acknowledged that he had recommended to the individual that he attend AA. Id. He conceded at the hearing that he knew the individual had elected not to go to AA. Id. at 169. The licensed mental health counselor believes, nevertheless, that he can function in the same capacity as AA. Id. at 170. However, by his own admission, the licensed mental health counselor has been unable to fulfill that AA role in only four visits. Id.

The DOE consultant-psychiatrist, after hearing the testimony of the individual and his psychotherapist, reaffirmed his opinion that the individual is not yet rehabilitated or reformed from his alcohol abuse. According to the DOE consultant-psychiatrist, the individual’s efforts at rehabilitation to date are not of sufficient duration or intensity, noting that weekly visits by the individual to his psychotherapist for five months and four one-hour visits to the licensed mental health counselor are barely satisfactory. Id. at 133, 136, 147. He opined that the individual needs, at a minimum, one year of sobriety, coupled with intensive treatment, to be considered rehabilitated. Id. at 133-34. He also testified that he agreed with the individual’s psychotherapist that nine more months of psychotherapy would be helpful. Id. at 149. The DOE consultant-psychiatrist further opined that the frequency of psychotherapy sessions should increase from once to several times each week during that nine month period. Id.

In the administrative process, it is the Hearing Officer who has the responsibility for assessing whether a person with an alcohol problem has presented sufficient evidence of rehabilitation or reformation to allay security concerns. See Personnel Security Hearing, Case No. VSO-0106, 26 DOE ¶ 82,767 (1997), aff’d, Personnel Security Review, Case No. VSA-0106, 26 DOE ¶ 83,009 (1997). The DOE does not have a set policy on what constitutes rehabilitation and reformation from alcohol abuse, but instead makes a case-by-case determination based on the available evidence. Personnel Security Hearing, (Case No. VSO-0154), 26 DOE ¶ 82,794 (1997), appeal filed. However, hearing officers accord great deference to the expert opinions of psychiatrists and other mental health professionals regarding rehabilitation and reformation. See e.g., Personnel Security Hearing, Case No. VSO-0146, 26 DOE ¶ 82,788 (1997), appeal filed; Personnel Security Hearing, Case No. VSO- 0027, 25 DOE ¶ 82,764 (1995); Personnel Security Hearing, Case No. VSO-0015, 25 DOE ¶ 82,760 (1995).

Based on the evidence in the record, I am unable to conclude that the individual has been sufficiently rehabilitated to mitigate the DOE’s security concerns. I am particularly troubled by the individual’s refusal in the early 1980s to heed a counselor’s advice to abstain from alcohol and attend AA to address his admitted alcohol abuse during that time period. In view of the individual’s admission that he became intoxicated ten times in 1986, I conclude that the individual was unable to grapple on his own with the alcohol problems that beset him in the early 1980s. With these facts in mind, I find that the individual has not been abstinent long enough (nine months) and has not undergone sufficient rehabilitative treatment (five months of weekly psychotherapy and four sessions with a licensed mental health counselor) to warrant a finding that he is rehabilitated from his current alcohol abuse. My view on this matter parallels that of the DOE consultant-psychiatrist.

In reaching this finding, I rejected the individual’s contention that his nine months of sobriety is so close to the minimum one-year abstention period recommended by the DOE consultant-psychiatrist that his security clearance should be restored. The individual’s focus on abstention alone is too narrow. In this case, his rehabilitation treatment is as important as his abstention. In this regard, I note that the individual’s own psychotherapist agrees that the individual needs nine more months of psychotherapy to address issues relating to his alcohol use. In addition, the individual’s licensed mental health counselor conceded that even if he were to stand in AA’s stead, the individual would need more counseling to assist him in maintaining his sobriety. These same considerations have led Hearing Officers in other DOE security clearance cases involving alcohol abuse to find that there was insufficient rehabilitation or reformation to resolve alcohol-related concerns under Criterion J. See Personnel Security Hearing, Case No. VSO-0159, 26 DOE ¶ ___ (November 17, 1997) (nine and one-half months); Personnel Security Hearing, Case No. VSO-0154, 26 DOE ¶ 82,794 (1997), appeal filed (six months); Personnel Security Hearing, Case No. VSO-0018, 25 DOE ¶ 82,758, aff’d, Personnel Security Review, Case No. VSA-0018, 25 DOE ¶ 83,006 (1995) (affirmed by OSA, 1995) (five months).

Other evidence in the record also prevented me from finding that the individual is rehabilitated. While the individual is to be commended for maintaining his sobriety for nine months, I am not confident that he has accepted the gravity of his alcohol problem. At the hearing, the individual alternately denied and admitted that he is an alcoholic. Tr. at 42, 74. This vacillation caused me to wonder whether he is still in the state of denial. Moreover, I am concerned that the individual’s sobriety is not a priority in his life. At the hearing, he related that one of the reasons he elected not to take the recommendation of the DOE consultant-psychiatrist, his psychotherapist, and his licensed mental health counselor to attend AA is that AA meetings are held in the evenings, a time when he is too busy attending to other matters. (7) Under questioning, he testified that he would participate in AA if required (as opposed to it being recommended) by his psychotherapist or health care provider or counselor. Tr. at 76. This semantic argument again raises questions in my mind whether the individual (1) believes he has an alcohol problem, and (2) is serious about taking steps to achieve rehabilitation. Moreover, I am mindful that in the 1980s, the individual refused to heed professional advice to abstain from alcohol and attend AA. He also stopped seeing the counselor at that time believing he had resolved his alcohol concerns on his own. Exhibit 6 at 12. The individual’s past actions in this regard cause me to question how faithful he will be to adhering to his alcohol treatment in the future.

Even if I were to assume that the individual is sincere in his commitment to maintain sobriety, I am also worried that his support network may not be as strong as it could be. At the hearing, the individual’s live-in girlfriend testified that she has the capacity to provide support for the individual to recover from his alcohol abuse. Tr. at 182. Notwithstanding her assertion, the live-in girlfriend testified that she was unfamiliar with the treatment the individual had undergone up until that time, and was unsure how often the individual received psychotherapy and counseling for his alcohol problem. She also admitted there is still alcohol in the home she shares with the individual and she drinks alcoholic beverages at home. Id. While it is certainly possible for the individual to resist the temptation of alcohol in his house and to refrain from joining others in his house from imbibing from time to time, it is reasonable to assume that the road to recovery for the individual will be a more challenging one under these circumstances.

Finally, another factor I considered in assessing the sufficiency of the individual’s rehabilitative efforts to date is that the individual’s father died of an alcohol-related illness. Id. at 105. This fact was revealed at the hearing by the individual’s psychotherapist. Id. The DOE consultant-psychiatrist subsequently testified that when a first degree relative has an alcohol problem, there tends to be a genetic vulnerability. Id. at 132. This genetic vulnerability, opined the DOE consultant-psychiatrist, is yet another reason why the individual needs intensive rehabilitation treatment.

All the factors enumerated above make it difficult for me to accept the individual’s assurances regarding his future intentions with respect to alcohol abstention and treatment. These factors, coupled with the short duration of his sobriety and minimal rehabilitative treatment he has received thus far, prevent me from concluding that the individual has mitigated the DOE’s concern regarding his past alcohol-related use and a current diagnosis of alcohol abuse.

2. Job Performance

The individual contends that his excellent job performance should mitigate or resolve the DOE’s security concerns about his off-the-job alcohol use. In this regard, he provided 20 letters of commendation, letters of appreciation, and congratulatory notes to support his claim of exemplary service to the DOE contractor during his 19-year tenure. Exhibits H-AA. In addition, the individual’s supervisor testified that the individual is one of his top employees. Furthermore, one of the DOE witnesses, a contractor management official, reviewed the individual’s personnel file and testified the individual has done an excellent job at the facility. Tr. at 82.

I am impressed by the accolades bestowed upon the individual by his employer over the years. It appears that the individual’s alcohol abuse has not, to date, affected his ability to perform his job responsibilities. Sobriety and reliability on the job, however, do not overcome the security concerns. Excessive consumption of alcohol off the job raises security concerns because of the possibility that a clearance holder may say or do something under the influence of alcohol that violates security regulations. See Personnel Security Hearing, VSO-0106, 26 DOE ¶ 82,767, aff’d, 26 DOE ¶ 83,009 (1997) (affirmed by OSA, 1997), and cases cited therein. The fact that this has apparently not occurred in the past is no guarantee that it will not occur in the future. For this reason, I cannot find that the individual’s work record alone resolves the alcohol-related concerns advanced by the DOE.

V. Conclusion

As explained in this Opinion, I find that the DOE properly invoked 10 C.F.R.§710.8(j) in suspending the individual's access authorization. I further find that the arguments advanced by the individual in his defense do not mitigate the security concerns accompanying that criterion. In view of Criterion J and the record before me, I cannot find that restoring the individual's access authorization would not endanger the common defense and security and would be clearly consistent with the national interest. Accordingly, in my opinion, the individual's access authorization should not be restored.

The regulations set forth at 10 C.F.R. § 710.28(a) provide that either the Office of Security Affairs or the individual may file a request for review of this Hearing Officer's Opinion within 30 calendar days of receipt of the Opinion. Any such request must be filed with the Director, Office of Hearings and Appeals, 1000 Independence Ave., S.W., Washington, D.C. 20585-0107, and served on the other party. The party seeking review of the Opinion must file a statement identifying the issues that it wishes to contest within 15 calendar days after the party files its request for review. The party seeking review must serve a copy of its statement on the other party, who may file a response within 20 days of receipt of the statement. 10 C.F.R. § 710.28(b). Submissions must be served on the Office of Security Affairs at the following address:

Director

Office of Safeguards and Security, NN-51

Office of Security Affairs

U.S. Department of Energy

19901 Germantown Road

Germantown, MD. 20874

Ann S. Augustyn

Hearing Officer

Office of Hearings and Appeals

Date: Deember 9, 1997

(1)Access authorization is defined as an administrative determination that an individual is eligible for access to classified matter or is eligible for access to, or control over, special nuclear material. 10 C.F.R. § 710.5(a). Such authorization will be referred to from time to time in this Opinion as access authorization or security clearance.

(2)Criterion J concerns information that reveals that a person has “[b]een, or is, a user of alcohol habitually to excess, or has been diagnosed by a board-certified psychiatrist, other licensed physician or a licensed clinical psychologist as alcohol dependent or as suffering from alcohol abuse.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.8(j).

(3)There is some confusion in the record regarding the exact date of the incident in question. For purposes of this Opinion, the exact date is irrelevant.

(4)At the hearing, the individual offered several excuses for his inability to pass the field sobriety test, including a prior knee injury, distorted vision due to the glare from the emergency vehicles’ lights, and his two friends’ perception that he had passed the test. Tr. at 64-65. I am unpersuaded by the individual’s unsubstantiated excuses. As noted in Section II above, this is not a criminal case in which one can raise reasonable doubt to allay security concerns associated with a particular incident or behavior. It is the burden of the individual to present evidence to support his defenses.

Even if I were to accept the individual’s contention that a knee injury prevented him from hopping on one foot or walking toe-to-toe during the field sobriety test, I cannot accept his contention that he failed the nystagmus test due to flashing lights at the accident scene or his belief that he passed the test because his two friends’ opined that he had. The individual presented no evidence to support his position that the glare fromemergency vehicles’ lights could have adversely affected the results of his nystagmus test. Nor did he present the police report of the incident in question which might have indicated the conditions under which the field sobriety tests were administered. As for the perception of the two friends, I find it hard to believe that either would be in a position to evaluate the individual’s sobriety at the time in question given the individual’s testimony that the two friends had shared a 12-pack of beer in the hour before the State Police stopped the vehicle.

(5)In finding that a security concern exists, I also considered the testimony of the individual’s psychotherapist who stated that he was unsure that the individual’s drinking pattern met the definition of alcohol abuse as that term is defined in the DSM-IV. Tr. at 100-101. The psychotherapist’s uncertainty on this matter did not, in my opinion, undermine the DOE consultant-psychiatrist’s unwavering position that the individual did fit the definition of an alcohol abuser for purposes of the DSM-IV. I find that the psychotherapist’s uncertainty on this issue is offset by his admission that the individual had “alcoholic patterns” that need to be addressed. Tr. at 100.

(6)At the hearing, the DOE consultant-psychiatrist reaffirmed his diagnosis of alcohol abuse even after learning that the individual’s elevated liver enzymes might be caused by his Hepatitis C. Tr. at 35.

(7)The individual did also make it clear that he objected to AA because he is not comfortable “with some of the sob stories and that method of counseling . . . it was sort of a big group therapy and everybody gets up and admits their sins.” Tr. at 42.