Case No. VSO-0328, 27 DOE ¶ 82,849 (H.O. F. Brown May 16, 2000)

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* The original of this document contains information which is subject to withholding from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 552. Such material has been deleted from this copy and replaced with XXXXXXX’s.

May 16, 2000

DECISION AND ORDER

OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

Hearing Officer's Opinion

Case Name: Personnel Security Hearing

Date of Filing: December 29, 1999

Case Number: VSO-0328

This Opinion concerns the eligibility of XXXXXX XXXXX XXXXXXX (hereinafter referred to as "the individual") to hold an access authorization under the regulations set forth at 10 C.F.R. Part 710, entitled "Criteria and Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Matter or Special Nuclear Material."(1) A Department of Energy Operations Office (DOE) suspended the individual's access authorization under the provisions of Part 710. This Opinion considers whether, on the basis of the evidence and testimony presented in this proceeding, the individual's access authorization should be restored. As set forth in this Opinion, I have determined that the individual's security clearance should not be restored.

I. Background

The provisions of 10 C.F.R. Part 710 govern the eligibility of individuals who are employed by or are applicants for employment with DOE contractors, agents, DOE access permittees, and other persons designated by the Secretary of Energy for access to classified matter or special nuclear material. Part 710 generally provides that "[t]he decision as to access authorization is a comprehensive, common-sense judgment, made after consideration of all relevant information, favorable or unfavorable, as to whether the granting of access authorization would not endanger the common defense and security and would be clearly consistent with the national interest." 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(a).

In this instance, DOE granted the individual an access authorization as a condition of his employment with a DOE contractor. However, on September 1, 1999, the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE Security) initiated formal administrative review proceedings by informing the individual that his access authorization was being suspended pending the resolution of certain derogatory information that created substantial doubt regarding his continued eligibility. This derogatory information is described in a Notification Letter subsequently issued to the individual on November 18, 1999. More specifically, Enclosure 1 attached to the Notification Letter contains DOE Security’s findings with respect to the individual that fall within the purview of potentially disqualifying criteria set forth in the security regulations at 10 C.F.R. §§ 710.8(f), (h), (j) and (l). The bases for these findings are summarized below.

Enclosure 1 of the Notification Letter alleges initially that the individual “[d]eliberately misrepresented, falsified, or omitted significant information from . . . a Questionnaire for Sensitive Positions . . . in response to official inquiry into a matter that is relevant to a determination regarding eligibility for DOE access authorization, . . . .” 10 C.F.R. § 710.8(f) (Criterion F). In this regard, DOE Security found that in completing a Questionnaire for National Security Positions (QSP) on two occasions, first in March 1994 and then in May 1999, the individual failed to list all incidents in which he had been charged with offenses related to alcohol, as required.

Secondly, the Notification Letter alleges that the individual has “an illness or mental condition of a nature which, in the opinion of a board-certified psychiatrist . . . may cause, a significant defect in judgment or reliability.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.8(h) (Criterion H). In support of this assertion, Enclosure 1 states that on July 11, 1999, the individual was evaluated by a DOE consultant psychiatrist (DOE Psychiatrist), who diagnosed the individual with Major Depressive Disorder and Alcohol Abuse by History and further concluded that the individual’s mental condition, particularly in relation to his alcohol use, causes or may cause a significant defect in his judgment and reliability.

Next, DOE Security asserts that the individual “has been, or is a user of alcohol habitually to excess, or has been diagnosed by a board-certified psychiatrist as alcohol dependent or as suffering from alcohol abuse.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.8(j) (Criterion J). In this regard, Enclosure 1 again refers to the report of the DOE Psychiatrist, finding that the individual has “a history of what appears to be long standing and ongoing alcohol use” which includes several arrests for Driving Under the Influence (DUI), and that the individual is “at this point without evidence of rehabilitation and reformation.” The Notification Letter also references the individual’s own admissions regarding his alcohol use, made during a Personnel Security Interview (PSI) conducted with the individual on June 2, 1999.

Finally, DOE Security alleges under section 710.8(l) that the individual has “engaged in unusual conduct . . . which tends to show that [he] is not honest, reliable, or trustworthy, or which furnishes reason to believe that [he] may be subject to pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress which may cause [him] to act contrary to the best interests of the national security.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.8(l) (Criterion L). The basis for DOE Security’s concern in this respect is that during a PSI conducted on March 1, 1995, the individual assured DOE Security that he was going to stop drinking. As described by the individual during the June 2, 1999 PSI, however, the individual continued to drink, sometimes excessively.

In a letter received by the DOE Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) on December 29, 1999, the individual exercised his right under Part 710 to request a hearing in this matter. 10 C.F.R. § 710.21(b). On January 6, 2000, I was appointed as Hearing Officer in this case. After conferring with the individual and the appointed DOE Counsel, 10 C.F.R. § 710.24, a hearing date was established. At the hearing, the DOE Counsel called as witnesses the DOE Psychiatrist and the individual. The individual’s witnesses included a clinical neuropsychologist (Psychologist), a neighbor and a co-worker. The transcript taken at the hearing will be hereinafter cited as "Tr.". Various documents that were submitted by the DOE Counsel and the individual during this proceeding constitute exhibits to the hearing transcript and will be cited as "Exh.".

Summary of Findings

The following factual summary is essentially uncontroverted. However, I will indicate instances in which there are disparate viewpoints regarding the information presented in the record.

The individual initially made application for a security clearance by completing a QSP submitted on March 27, 1994. DOE Security ultimately granted the individual an access authorization in March 1995 following its satisfactory resolution of certain matters regarding the individual, including his omission of critical information from his QSP and that he has a history of excessive alcohol use. In the initial matter, DOE Security found that although the individual listed only three prior arrests for DUI on his QSP, the individual had in fact been arrested for DUI in five occasions during the years 1976 through 1989. The individual explained during a December 1994 PSI that he had failed to list all of the DUI arrests due to failed memory. Regarding his past excessive use of alcohol, DOE Security accepted the individual’s assurances made during a March 1995 PSI that he understood the security concerns associated with alcohol abuse, that he no longer drank to excess and that he would likely be quitting altogether due to his diabetic condition.

However, DOE Security was led to reexamine the individual’s eligibility to hold an access authorization in May 1999, after receiving information from the individual that he had been charged with Terroristic Threatening following a verbal altercation with a man at the man’s residence in the neighboring county. In reporting this matter to DOE Security, the individual was required to complete another QSP. In doing so, the individual failed to list all of his past arrests for DUI, but only the final DUI arrest and conviction which occurred in 1989.

The individual explained the circumstances of the charges filed against him for Terroristic Threatening during a PSI conducted on June 2, 1999. According to the individual, a man whom he has known for 25 years, although not a friend, filed charges against him after a heated argument about certain false allegations concerning the individual that the man had told to the individual’s ex-wife. After months of marital difficulties, the individual and his ex-wife (the individual’s fifth wife) were divorced in March 1999. The individual states that a few months after the divorce, his ex-wife informed him of the accusations the man had made against him while they were still married. The individual has declined to describe the nature of the accusations made against him by the man, but is adamant in his belief that the false information the man conveyed to his ex-wife substantially contributed to their divorce. The individual states that he therefore drove to the man’s house to confront him. The individual states that the man freely admitted telling the ex-wife the derogatory information and a heated argument ensued. The individual denies, however, threatening to kill the man, as charged by the man in his complaint. The individual further asserts that he was not under the influence of alcohol on that day, since he had quit drinking during the period following his divorce, approximately a month and a half prior to the June 2, 1999 PSI. The individual admitted, however, that before quitting, his drinking had been “fairly heavy” during the preceding year and a half, on the order of “a 12-pack a day.”

The Terroristic Threatening charge was ultimately settled and dismissed, based upon the individual’s agreement to have no further contact with the man. Notwithstanding, DOE Security determined that the individual should be referred to the DOE Psychiatrist for evaluation. The DOE Psychiatrist reviewed the individual’s personnel security file, interviewed the individual and administered a battery of psychological tests. In his report dated July 15, 1999, the DOE Psychiatrist diagnosed the individual with Major Depressive Disorder and Alcohol Abuse by History. In the latter regard, the DOE Psychiatrist concluded: “[The individual] presents a history of what appears to be long standing and ongoing alcohol use. . . . He does show a pattern of habitual and excess use of alcohol at this point without evidence of rehabilitation or reformation. Given his statement about his behavior regarding a recent conflict with his neighbor, I do feel this is indicative of difficulty which causes a significant defect in his judgement and reliability.”

According to the individual, he resumed drinking in July 1999, limited to no more than two to three beers on a given day. The individual states that he underwent another period of abstinence in September and October 1999, but again resumed drinking. The individual asserts that he finally stopped drinking during Christmas week in December 1999, and has consumed no alcohol since that time. On January 18, 2000, the individual entered an intensive outpatient alcohol treatment program administered by an area facility (Treatment Facility). According to the records of the Treatment Facility, “[the individual] began treatment on 1-18-00 and was discharged on 2-1-00. [The individual] was compliant with the program attending 21 hours of chemical dependency groups. He also attended AA [Alcoholics Anonymous] outside of this program . . . .” Documentation provided by the individual confirms that he has attended one to three AA meetings per week since leaving the Treatment Facility.

II. Analysis

A DOE administrative review proceeding under 10 C.F.R. Part 710 is not a criminal matter, in which the burden is on the government to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Personnel Security Hearing, Case No. VSO-0078, 25 DOE ¶ 82,802 (1996). In this type of case, we are dealing with a different standard designed to protect national security interests. A hearing is "for the purpose of affording the individual an opportunity of supporting his eligibility for access authorization." 10 C.F.R. § 710.21(b)(6). Once DOE Security has made a showing of derogatory information raising security concerns, the burden is on the individual to come forward at the hearing with evidence to convince the DOE that restoring his access authorization "would not endanger the common defense and security and would be clearly consistent with the national interest." 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(d). This standard implies that there is a strong presumption against the granting or restoring of a security clearance. See Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988) ("clearly consistent with the national interest" standard for the granting of security clearances indicates "that security determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials"); Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991) (strong presumption against the issuance of a security clearance).

I have thoroughly considered the record of this proceeding, including the submissions of the parties, the evidence presented and the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing convened in this matter. In resolving the question of the individual's eligibility for access authorization, I have been guided by the applicable factors prescribed in 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(c): the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; the frequency and recency of the conduct; the voluntariness of the participation; the absence or presence of rehabilitation or reformation and other pertinent behavioral changes; the motivation for the conduct; the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; the likelihood of continuance or recurrence; and other relevant and material factors. After due deliberation, it is my opinion that the individual's access authorization should not be restored since I am unable to conclude that such restoration would not endanger the common defense and security and would be clearly consistent with the national interest. 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(a). The specific findings that I make in support of this determination are discussed below.

A. Criterion F, Falsification

DOE Security alleges in the Notification Letter that the individual “[d]eliberately misrepresented, falsified, or omitted significant information” in completing a QSP on two occasions. First, when initially seeking to obtain a security clearance in March 1994, the individual listed only three DUI arrests, in 1977, 1988 and 1989, while the subsequent background investigation of the individual uncovered two additional DUI arrests, in 1978 and 1980. Secondly, in completing a QSP in May 1999, the individual listed only one DUI arrest, with the date unspecified. In both instances, however, I have concluded that the omissions did not constitute a deliberate attempt to misrepresent, falsify or omit significant information in evaluating the individual’s eligibility to hold a security clearance.

The individual testified that in completing the March 1994 QSP, he relied upon computer information that one of his ex-wives obtained on his behalf from the police. Tr. at 67-68. The individual suggested that the police records may not have listed one of the arrests because in that instance the DUI charge was reduced and did not result in a DUI conviction. Tr. at 66-67. According to the individual, he simply forgot the other DUI arrest (1978), which occurred more than 15 years before he was required to complete the March 1994 QSP. As pointed out by the individual, these explanations were accepted by DOE Security in granting him a security clearance in March 1994. I am also satisfied with this explanation.

With regard to May 1999 QSP omissions, the individual asserted that his sole objective in completing a new QSP was to report the Terroristic Threatening charge. The individual explained that in focusing on the Terroristic Threatening charge, he confused the QSP item (Question 23f) under which he reported the Terroristic Threatening charge, requiring that he list only charges occurring within the last seven years, with the QSP item (Question 23d) requiring that he list all arrests related to alcohol. Tr. at 64. The individual testified that based upon this erroneous reading of the form, he listed only one DUI charge because he could not recall whether the final DUI (in 1989) had occurred within the preceding seven-year period. Tr. at 64- 65. The individual insists that it was not his intent to hide the other DUI arrests, and indeed he believed there was nothing to hide since DOE Security had been fully apprised of his DUI arrests when he initially sought his security clearance in 1994. Tr. at 65-66. The individual states that in his mind it was only necessary that he list the Terroristic Threatening charge under Question 23f, but he decided to also list one DUI arrest thinking that the last may have fallen within the seven-year requirements of Question 23f.

My impression of the individual was that he was being honest in stating his explanation for not listing all of his DUI arrests on the May 1999 QSP. The individual was clearly hasty and careless in completing the QSP. However, I am persuaded that his negligence was caused by his narrow focus on the Terroristic Threatening charge and his erroneous belief that there was no need to list matters that had already been disclosed. I do not believe that there was a deliberate attempt on his part to misrepresent, falsify or omit information critical to the evaluation of his suitability to hold a security clearance.

B. Criterion H, Mental Condition; Criterion J, Alcohol Use

Next, DOE Security alleges in the Notification Letter that the individual has “a mental condition of a nature which, in the opinion of a board-certified psychiatrist . . . may cause, a significant defect in judgment or reliability.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.8(h). The Notification Letter further finds under Criterion J that the individual “has been, or is a user of alcohol habitually to excess, or has been diagnosed by a board- certified psychiatrist as alcohol dependent or as suffering from alcohol abuse.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.8(j). I will consider concurrently the concerns of DOE Security under Criterion H and Criterion J since they are substantially interrelated. The individual’s “mental condition” which DOE Security alleges may result in “a significant defect in judgment and reliability” under Criterion H is the history of excessive alcohol use without rehabilitation alleged under Criterion J.(2)

DOE Security relies upon the report of the DOE Psychiatrist in reaching its findings set forth in the Notification Letter under both Criterion H and Criterion J. Exh. 8 (Report of Psychiatric Evaluation, dated July 15, 1999). The DOE Psychiatrist points to a number of factors leading to his conclusions regarding the individual’s alcohol use, including the individual’s five arrests for DUI during the period 1976-1989, the individual’s previous failed attempts to quit drinking, his admission that all of his ex- wives complained about his excessive drinking during their five marriages which all ended in divorce, and the individual’s admission that he drank habitually to excess during the one and one-half year period prior to his final divorce in March 1999.(3) The DOE Psychiatrist finally points to the Terroristic Threatening charge as indicative of a defect in the individual’s judgment and reliability: “He does appear to show a pattern of habitual and excess use of alcohol at this point without evidence of rehabilitation and reformation. Given his statement about his behavior regarding a recent conflict with his neighbor, I do feel this is indicative of difficulty which causes a significant defect in his judgment and reliability.” Exh. 8 at 4; Tr. at 11-16.

The individual does not dispute the factual findings underlying the DOE Psychiatrist’s diagnosis of Alcohol Abuse by History. I therefore find that there is ample evidence in support of the allegations set forth in the Notification Letter under Criterion H and Criterion J, related to the individual’s history of alcohol abuse. As a general matter, excessive use of alcohol by an individual holding a security clearance is a legitimate security concern since the ability to safeguard national security information is diminished when judgment or reliability is impaired, and individuals who abuse alcohol may be susceptible to being coerced or exploited to reveal classified matters. These security concerns are indeed important and have been recognized by a number of Hearing Officers in similar cases. See, e.g., Personnel Security Hearing, Case No. VSO-0221, 27 DOE ¶ 82,792 at 85,762 (1999); Personnel Security Hearing, Case No. VSO-0200, 27 DOE ¶ 82,770 at 85,628 (1998). I therefore turn to whether the individual has presented sufficient mitigating evidence to overcome the concerns of DOE Security relating to his use of alcohol. Based upon the record before me, I have determined that the individual has failed to carry his burden in this regard.

1. Mitigating Evidence

In order to achieve reformation and rehabilitation, the DOE Psychiatrist recommended that the individual undergo a formal treatment program supplemented by AA, and maintain complete abstinence from alcohol for an indefinite period. Tr. at 18-19, 22. The DOE Psychiatrist testified that as long as the individual remains completely abstinent, he perceived no ongoing defect in the individual’s judgment and reliability. Tr. at 20. The record indicates that the individual has made significant strides toward fulfilling this recommended course of rehabilitation and reformation.

The individual maintains that he has used no alcohol since December 1999. Tr. at 79. The individual presented evidence showing that during the two-week period January 18 through February 1, 2000, the individual successfully completed an intensive outpatient alcohol treatment program administered by a reputable Treatment Facility. Exh. 12. The individual testified that since completing the Treatment Facility program, he has a different view of his past alcohol use and now realizes that it was excessive. Tr. at 95-96. According to the individual, “I don’t intend to drink anymore.” Tr. at 97. Documentation provided by the individual shows that he has attended one to three AA meetings per week since leaving the Treatment Facility. Exh. 14.

The Psychologist testified that, based upon his examination of the individual over several sessions in February and March 2000, the individual appears to be in remission from his alcohol abuse disorder. Tr. at 38-39. On the basis of the tests he administered, the Psychologist believes that the individual has being truthful when the individual says that he has consumed no alcohol since December 1999. Tr. at 39. In addition, the Psychologist, who specializes in neuropsychology, testified that his testing revealed no ongoing neuro-cognitive damage from his past alcohol use that would portend a defect in his judgment and reliability. Tr. at 39-40. Regarding the Terroristic Threatening incident, the Psychologist dismissed it as “a case of tempers flaring and somebody calling the police.” Tr. at 42.

Nonetheless, I conclude that the present period of abstinence undertaken by the individual is too short in duration to mitigate sufficiently the security concerns attached to his past alcohol use. The individual admittedly resumed drinking in July 1999 following a brief period of abstinence, and he did not again become abstinent until December 1999. The individual’s current period of abstinence of less than six months is not assuring from the standpoint of DOE Security, in view of the individual’s past failed attempts to stop drinking and his recurrent pattern of excessive alcohol consumption. The DOE Psychiatrist testified that there is a significant risk of relapse on the part of the individual prior to his achieving one year of sustained abstinence. Tr. at 26-27. This opinion of the DOE Psychiatrist is consistent with other cases involving diagnoses of excessive alcohol use, finding that DOE Security’s concerns may be mitigated by evidence of the successful completion of a viable alcohol treatment program combined with a minimum of one year of abstention from alcohol. See Personnel Security Hearing, Case No. VSO-0245, 27 DOE ¶ 82,795 at 85,783 (1999), citing Personnel Security Hearing, Case No. VSO-0167, 26 DOE ¶ 82,801 (1997); Personnel Security Hearing, Case No. VSO- 0226, 27 DOE ¶ 82,780 (1998); see also Personnel Security Hearing, Case No. VSO- 0221, 27 DOE ¶ 82,792 at 85,763 (1999). Consistent with the opinion of the DOE Psychiatrist, the Psychologist expressed his opinion concerning the individual’s risk of relapse: “Given the fact that it has been less than six months . . . the risk is a toss- up right now. It is about fifty/fifty.” Tr. at 49. Under these circumstances, I find that the individual has failed to adequately mitigate the concerns of DOE Security under Criterion H and Criterion J.

C. Criterion L; Unusual Conduct

Finally, DOE Security has asserted under Criterion L that the individual has “engaged in unusual conduct ... which tends to show that [he] is not honest, reliable, or trustworthy, or which furnishes reason to believe that [he] may be subject to pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress which may cause [him] to act contrary to the best interest of the national security.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.8(l) (Criterion L). The basis for DOE Security’s concern in this regard is that despite assuring DOE Security during the March 1995 PSI that he was going to stop drinking, the individual continued to drink and in fact his drinking admittedly became excessive.

I have examined the transcript of the March 1995 PSI, and find that the individual did not commit to when he would stop drinking, but only that “I’m going to have to . . . My diabetes is getting worse.” Exh. 19 at 5. However, the individual did assure DOE Security of his intention never to again drink habitually to excess. Id. at 7. Although the individual eventually failed to fulfill this intention, I have concluded that the individual’s inability to control his alcoholism did not constitute a deliberate act bearing upon his honesty, reliability and trustworthiness, within the purview of Criterion L.

The testimony of his friends and co-workers, as well as other letters of commendation submitted into the record confirm that the individual is considered to be honest, reliable and trustworthy. Tr. at 54, 59; Exh. 18. The individual also impressed me with his candor, and was convincing in his testimony that his fall back into excessive alcohol use during 1998 and early 1999 stemmed from the difficulties he was having with his wife prior to their divorce. Tr. at 75-78. As observed by the Psychologist, the individual’s depression disorder may have also played a role in his receding into excessive alcohol use, noting “that’s a very difficult thing to sort out because some people may experience depression and may drink in an attempt to medicate that.” Tr. at 39-40. It is also evident that the individual lacked the capacity to understand and control his alcohol use without proper treatment and counseling. Tr. at 95-97. Based upon the record before me, I am persuaded that the individual did not knowingly attempt to mislead DOE Security with his assurances during the March 1995 PSI.

III. Conclusion

As explained in this Opinion, I find that DOE Security properly invoked 10 C.F.R. §§ 710.8(f), (h), (j) and (l) in suspending the individual's access authorization. For the reasons I have described above, I find that the individual did not commit deliberate falsification under section 710.8(f), or engage in unusual conduct within the purview of section 710.8(l). However, the individual has failed to sufficiently mitigate the concerns of DOE Security that he has a mental condition which may cause a defect in his judgment and reliability, 10 C.F.R. § 710.8(h), or that he has been a user of alcohol habitually to excess without rehabilitation, 10 C.F.R. § 710.8(j). I am therefore unable to find that restoring the individual's access authorization would not endanger the common defense and security and would be consistent with the national interest. Accordingly, I find that the individual's access authorization should not be restored.

The regulations set forth at 10 C.F.R. § 710.28(a) provide that the Office of Security Affairs or the individual may file a request for review of this Hearing Officer's Opinion within 30 calendar days of receipt of the Opinion. Any such request must be filed with the Director, Office of Hearings and Appeals, 1000 Independence Ave., S.W., Washington, D.C. 20585-0107, and served on the other party. If either party elects to seek review of the Opinion, that party must file a statement identifying the issues on which it wishes the OHA Director to focus. This statement must be filed within 15 calendar days after the party files its request for review. The party seeking review must serve a copy of its statement on the other party, who may file a response within 20 days of receipt of the statement. 10 C.F.R. § 710.28(b). The address where submissions must be sent for purposes of serving them on the Office of Security Affairs is as follows:

Director

Office of Safeguards and Security, NN-51

Office of Security Affairs

U.S. Department of Energy

19901 Germantown Road

Germantown, MD 20874-1290

Fred L. Brown

Hearing Officer

Office of Hearings and Appeals

Date: May 16, 2000

(1)An access authorization is an administrative determination that an individual is eligible for access to classified matter or special nuclear material. 10 C.F.R. § 710.5. Such authorization will be referred to variously in this Opinion as an access authorization or security clearance.

(2)In his report, the DOE Psychiatrist also diagnosed the individual with Major Depressive Disorder, Possibly Recurrent. In this regard, the report notes that the individual was treated for anxiety and depression in 1981, and was taking Paxil (an anti-depressant medication) for four months during 1999. Exh. 8 at 2. However, the DOE Psychiatrist does not find depression as a mental condition which may cause a significant defect in the individual’s judgment and reliability, noting in his report that the individual scored within the range of normal on the Beck Depression Inventory test. Id. at 3; Tr. at 20-21. The DOE Psychiatrist instead focuses on the individual’s history of alcohol use as a security concern under Criterion H.

(3)The individual recounted to the DOE Psychiatrist the same information relayed during his June 1999 PSI that, in this period, he generally consumed a 12-pack a day. See Exh. 11 (June 2, 1999 PSI) at 11. The individual maintains, however, that it takes 18 to 20 beers to intoxicate him. Id. at 12; Exh. 8 at 1.