Case No. VSO-0440, 28 DOE ¶ 82,807 (H.O. Augustyn July 9, 2001)

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* The original of this document contains information which is subject to withholding from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 552. Such material has been deleted from this copy and replaced with XXXXXXX’s.

July 9, 2001

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

Hearing Officer's Opinion

Name of Case:Personnel Security Hearing

Date of Filing:March 12, 2001

Case Number: VSO-0440

This Opinion concerns the eligibility of xxxxxxxxxx (the individual) for restoration of his access authorization under the Department of Energy (DOE) regulations set forth at 10 C.F.R. Part 710, Subpart A, entitled "General Criteria and Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Matter or Special Nuclear Material."(1) A DOE Operations Office suspended the individual’s access authorization pursuant to the provisions of Part 710. As discussed below, after carefully considering the record before me in light of the relevant regulations, I recommend that the individual’s access authorization be restored.

I. Background

For several years the individual has been employed by a DOE contractor in a position that requires him to maintain an access authorization. In 1999, the DOE commenced a routine background reinvestigation of the individual. As part of that process, the individual completed a Questionnaire for National Security Positions (QNSP) and, on May 20, 1999, he attested to the accuracy of the information contained on that form. Six months later, the individual reaffirmed the information contained on the QNSP when he met with an investigator from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Five days after meeting with the OPM investigator, the individual contacted the OPM investigator and informed her that he had provided an incorrect response to one of the questions on the QNSP.

The individual’s revelation prompted the DOE to conduct a Personnel Security Interview (PSI) with the individual. When the PSI failed to resolve the security concerns associated with the individual’s falsifications, the DOE obtained authority from the Director of the Office of Safeguards and Security to initiate this administrative review proceeding. The DOE then issued a Notification Letter to the individual, citing the individual’s falsifications as derogatory information that created a substantial doubt as to the individual’s continued eligibility for an access authorization under 10 C.F.R. §710.8 (f) (Criterion F). (2)

Upon receipt of the Notification Letter, the individual filed a response to the Notification Letter and requested a hearing. The DOE transmitted the individual's hearing request to the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) Director, and the OHA Director appointed me as the Hearing Officer in this case. 10 C.F.R. § 710.25 (a), (b). I convened a hearing in this matter within the time frame prescribed by the DOE regulations. 10 C.F.R. § 710.25(g).

At the hearing, the DOE called one witness, a personnel security specialist. The individual represented himself at the hearing and offered his own testimony and that of seven witnesses: his mother, two colleagues, two supervisors and two subordinates. The DOE submitted eleven exhibits into the record (Exhibits 1-11); the individual tendered two (Exhibits A and B). On June 8, 2001, I closed the record in this case when I received the hearing transcript (hereinafter referred to as “Tr.”) and supplemental information from the DOE. See 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(e).

II. Standard of Review

A DOE administrative proceeding under 10 C.F.R. Part 710 is authorized when the existence of derogatory information leaves unresolved questions about an individual’s eligibility for access authorization. A hearing is “for the purpose of affording the individual an opportunity of supporting his eligibility for access authorization.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.21(b)(6). Once DOE Security has made a showing of derogatory information raising security concerns, the individual must come forward with evidence to convince the DOE that restoring his access authorization “would not endanger the common defense and security and would be clearly consistent with the national interest.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(d). See Personnel Security Hearing (Case No. VSO-0013), 24 DOE ¶ 82,752 at 85,511 (1995) (affirmed by OSA, 1996), and cases cited therein. This standard implies that there is a strong presumption against the granting or restoring of a security clearance. See Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988) (“clearly consistent with the national interest” standard for the granting of security clearances indicates “that security determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials”); Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1990) (strong presumption against the issuance of a security clearance).

III. Findings of Fact

Most of the facts in this case are not disputed. In January 1997, the individual, a United States citizen, applied for a foreign passport at his mother’s request. Tr. at 161-62, 166. (3) On March 12, 1997, a foreign government issued a passport to the individual. See Ex. A.

Two years later, the DOE commenced a routine reinvestigation of the individual to continue his access authorization. In that connection, on May 20, 1999, the individual signed a QNSP and attested to its accuracy. See Ex. 6. Question 17 (d) on the QNSP queries: “In the last 7 years, have you had an active passport that was issued by a foreign government?” Id. The individual responded "no" to this question. Id.

On November 10, 1999, an OPM investigator interviewed the individual as part of the routine reinvestigation. See Ex. 8. During that interview, the individual affirmed his May 20, 1999 QNSP responses. Id. Five days later, on November 15, 1999, the individual contacted the OPM investigator and advised her that he possessed an active passport issued by a foreign government and that he had lied on Question 17 (d) on the QNSP. Id. The individual told the OPM investigator that he was afraid an affirmative response to the subject question would jeopardize his security clearance. Id.

Subsequently, the DOE conducted a PSI at which the individual voluntarily surrendered the foreign passport to DOE security. Tr. at 5. Sometime prior to the PSI, the individual had defaced the passport by cutting through the front page of the passport. Ex. A. During the PSI, the individual admitted again that he had lied on the QNSP because he feared that he might lose his security clearance. Ex. 7 at 35. He told the Personnel Security Specialist at the PSI that when he completed the QNSP in May 1999, he responded negatively to the subject question because he had rationalized in his mind that his foreign passport was not “active.” Tr. at 22, 35. He explained at the PSI that he had never signed the foreign passport, never used it and never intended to do so. Id., Ex. A. An examination of the passport reveals that it bears neither a signature nor any markings indicating entry to or egress from any country. Ex. A.

IV. Analysis

A. Security Concern Associated with the Falsifications At Issue

As noted earlier in this Opinion, the derogatory information in this case arises from the individual’s false response on the QNSP he executed on May 20, 1999, and his reaffirmation of that falsification to the OPM investigator on November 10, 1999. It is undisputed that the individual deliberately lied on the QNSP about a significant matter, possessing an active passport issued by a foreign country. It is also undisputed that the individual perpetuated that lie by affirming his responses to the OPM investigator six months later.

False statements by an individual in the course of an official inquiry regarding a determination of eligibility for DOE access authorization raise serious issues of honesty, reliability, and trustworthiness. The DOE security program is based on trust, and when a security clearance holder breaches that trust, it is difficult to determine to what extent the individual can be trusted again in the future. See e.g.,Personnel Security Hearing (Case No. VSO-0013), 25 DOE ¶ 82,752 at 85,515 (1995), 25 DOE ¶ 82,752 (1995) (affirmed by OSA, 1995); Personnel Security Hearing (Case No. VSO-0281), 27 DOE ¶ 82,821 at 85,915 (1999), aff’d, 27 DOE ¶ 83,030 (2000) (terminated by OSA, 2000). In addition, as the Personnel Security Specialist testified, the DOE is concerned in this case about the individual’s susceptibility to coercion or blackmail because the individual was pressured by a loved one to obtain the foreign passport and concealed that fact. Tr. at 51-52. Based on the record before me, I find that the DOE correctly invoked Criteria F when it suspended the individual’s security clearance. (4)

A finding of derogatory information does not, however, end the evaluation of evidence concerning the individual’s eligibility for access authorization. See Personnel Security Hearing (Case No. VSO- 0244), 27 DOE ¶ 82,797 (1999) (affirmed by OSA, 1999); Personnel Security Hearing (Case No. VSO-0154), 26 DOE ¶ 82,794 (1997), aff’d, Personnel Security Review (Case No. VSA-0154), 27 DOE ¶ 83,008 (1998) (affirmed by OSA, 1998). Cases involving verified falsifications are nonetheless difficult to resolve because there are neither experts to opine about what constitutes rehabilitation from lying nor security programs to achieve rehabilitation. Therefore, Hearing Officers must look at the statements of an individual, the facts surrounding the falsification and the individual’s subsequent history in order to assess whether the individual has rehabilitated himself from the falsehood and whether restoring the security clearance would pose a threat to national security. See Personnel Security Hearing (Case No. VSO-0327), 27 DOE ¶ 82,844 (2000), aff’d, Personnel Security Review, 28 DOE ¶ 83,005 (2000) (affirmed by OSA, 2000); Personnel Security Hearing (Case No. VSO-0418), 28 DOE ¶ 82,795 at 85,705 (2001). In the end, like all Hearing Officers, I must exercise my common sense judgment whether the individual’s access authorization should be restored after considering the applicable factors prescribed in 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(c). (5)

B. Mitigating Evidence

The key issue in this case is whether the individual has brought forward sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he can now be trusted to be consistently honest and truthful with the DOE. In considering this question, I found that the nature of the individual’s falsifications was serious. Lying on the form that supplies the information on which a security clearance is granted and lying to an OPM investigator subvert the integrity of the access authorization process. I found also that the individual knowingly and voluntarily provided the false information on the form, and that he failed to correct the falsification when he first met with the OPM investigator. Furthermore, I determined that the individual’s motive in falsifying the QNSP and failing to correct that falsification when he first met with the OPM investigator was, at least in part, self-serving (fear of losing his security clearance).(6) Finally, I cannot ascribe the individual’s falsification to immaturity. The individual is a highly educated, mature person who has held an access authorization since 1994.

Balanced against the negative factors set forth above are the following positive ones. First and perhaps most critical, in my opinion, is that the individual voluntarily made a good-faith effort to correct his falsifications before being confronted with any facts suggesting he had lied regarding his possession of the active foreign passport. (7)

At the hearing, the personnel security specialist speculated that the individual may have disclosed his falsification because he was worried that the OPM investigator might learn of his falsification. Tr. at 39. There is no evidence in the record to support this speculation. On the contrary, the individual testified convincingly, in my opinion, that his only motivation in admitting his falsification was “to set the record straight.” Id. at 226. Specifically, the individual testified that he believes now and believed before he admitted his falsehood that neither OPM nor the DOE would have discovered his lie because the country that issued the foreign passport to him does not have diplomatic ties with the United States. Id. at 222-23. (8) According to the individual, he was guilt- ridden about his falsification after he had met face-to-face with the OPM investigator. Tr. at 196. He explained that after searching his conscience he decided that correcting the record was “the right thing to do” even though he recognized that his falsifications would be viewed negatively by DOE security. Id. at 195, 197, 226. He also asserted that he admitted his lie to demonstrate his commitment to the DOE, to show that he will not repeat similar mistakes in the future, and to gain back the trust of the United States government. Id. at 238; Response to the Notification Letter.

The record also supports the individual’s assertion that his self-disclosure of his falsifications was not prompted by any other external factor such as the threat of a polygraph. Id. at 200; see Letter from the DOE Counsel to the Hearing Officer and the individual (June 8, 2001). Cf. Personnel Security Review (Case No. VSA-0255), 27 DOE ¶ 83,022 (1999), reversing Personnel Security Hearing (Case No. VSO-0255), 27 DOE ¶ 82,801 (1999) (affirmed OSA, 2000) (threat of polygraph rendered a disclosure of falsification less than voluntary). Moreover, there is also no other evidence in the record suggesting that the individual’s admission regarding his falsification was tied to his fear that someone would reveal his lie, or his concern that he would be questioned further about the matter on a security form or in a security interview. This fact distinguishes this case from others where Hearing Officers have determined that a self-disclosure was not truly voluntary for purposes of the Part 710 regulations. See Personnel Security Hearing (Case No. VSO-0418), 28 DOE ¶ 82,795 (2001) (admission of lie during a personnel security interview prompted by a concern that individual would be undergoing drug testing); Personnel Security Hearing (Case No. VSO-0387), 28 DOE ¶ 82,776 (2000), appeal filed (admission only after being confronted with lie by a DOE consultant- psychiatrist); Personnel Security Hearing (Case No. VSO-0384), 28 DOE ¶ 82,789 (2001) (affirmed by OSA, 2001) (admission motivated by the individual’s concern about an impending DOE personnel security interview); Personnel Security Hearing (Case No. VSO-0327), 27 DOE ¶ 82,844 (2000), aff’d, Personnel Security Review (Case No. VSA-0327), 28 DOE ¶ 83,005 (2000) (affirmed by OSA, 2000) (individual confronted by information contained in an anonymous fax that he had lied about possessing a Ph.D.); Personnel Security Hearing (Case No. VSO-0289), 27 DOE ¶ 82,823 (1999), aff’d, 27 DOE ¶ 83,025 (2000) (affirmed by OSA, 2000) (revelation of falsification prompted by the requirement to complete newly revised security forms); Personnel Security Hearing (Case No. VSO-0049), 25 DOE ¶ 82,785 (1996), aff’d, Personnel Security Review (Case No. VSA- 0049), 25 DOE ¶ 83,011 (1996) (terminated by OSA, 1996) (disclosure of falsification not at clearance holder’s own initiative because disclosure made prior to obligation to complete an updated Questionnaire for Sensitive Positions). In the end, I am convinced from the documentary and testimonial evidence in the record that the individual voluntarily corrected his falsifications.

Second, evidence adduced at the hearing convinces me that the individual’s falsifications constituted isolated incidents in an otherwise unblemished career, rather than evidence of a long-term pattern of dishonesty. Six witnesses, all of whom knew that the individual had lied to the DOE about possessing a foreign passport, corroborated the individual’s own testimony that his lying represented an aberration in his professional and personal life.

Two of the individual’s supervisors provided testaments to the individual’s professional integrity and reputation for exercising extreme caution in fairly, honesty, and judiciously executing his job responsibilities. Tr. at 73-80; 138-142. One of the individual’s colleagues who has known him for 13 years testified that the individual’s falsifications were “definitely a very unusual exception to my normal understanding of [the individual’s] integrity, honesty, and it’s out of the norm based on my interaction [with the individual], both personal and professional.” Id. at 95. The same colleague related that the individual promotes trust within his organization, noting that the individual’s position demands that he uphold the highest ethical standards and be a person of integrity. Id. at 89. The colleague further recounted that the individual’s trustworthiness and integrity form the basis of their friendship. Id. at 93. Finally, according to the colleague, the individual always does what he says he will do, a character trait that evidences the individual’s reliability. Id. A second colleague who has known the individual for more than a decade offered his opinion that the individual’s two chief traits are his extreme trustworthiness and honesty. Id. at 149-151. In addition, two of the individual’s subordinates provided their assessment at the hearing that the individual is very honest, very fair, and very conscious of doing the right thing in the workplace. Tr. at 102, 121.

Third, regarding the extent of the individual’s lying, I note that the individual maintained his May 1999 falsehood for a six-month period, and his reaffirmation of that falsehood for two business days. See footnote 7 supra. With respect to the second falsehood, its duration is so short that I believe the individual’s prompt, voluntary, good faith recanting of his oral affirmation of the falsehood mitigates the import of the second falsification. As for the first falsification, while it is not a case of long-term deception, neither is it so short that it can be dismissed as insignificant. Cf. Personnel Security Hearing, (Case No. VSO-0057), 25 DOE ¶ 82,790 (1996), aff’d, 25 DOE ¶ 83,009 (1996)(affirmed by OSA, 1996) (12-year period of concealment constituted lengthy pattern of dishonesty); Personnel Security Review, (Case No. VSA-0255), 27 DOE ¶ 83,022 (1999), reversing, Personnel Security Hearing, (Case No. VSO-0255), 27 DOE ¶ 82,801 (1999) (affirmed by OSA, 2000)(nine-year period of concealment reflects a lengthy pattern of dishonesty).

Fourth, I find that any potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation or duress regarding the falsifications at issue has been resolved. In making this determination, I carefully considered several factors. As an initial matter, the individual has disclosed to his wife, his mother, his supervisors, subordinates and colleagues that he lied by concealing from the DOE that he had a foreign passport. During the six month period the individual concealed his foreign passport from the DOE, it is possible the individual could have been susceptible to blackmail or coercion. Now however, that possibility seems unlikely inasmuch as the individual has revealed his falsifications to those around him. In addition, the record in this case revealed that the individual applied for the foreign passport because he did not want to disobey his mother. Ex. 7 at 23. As the personnel security specialist testified, the DOE is concerned in this case that the individual was pressured by a loved one to obtain the foreign passport and to conceal the fact from the DOE. To me, this fact is quite worrisome. The record reflects that the individual felt compelled by his mother to obtain a foreign passport so his mother could settle his father’s estate in a foreign country. To ascertain whether the mother might be a source of potential coercion in the future, I questioned the mother at the hearing. The individual’s mother painstakingly testified about the steps she has taken to ensure that her son is never placed in a situation similar to the one that sparked the administrative review proceeding. She revealed that she is gradually moving her assets to the United States. Tr. at 182-83. She stated further that she would prefer that her assets go to charity in a foreign country rather than allow her son to take any action that would ever again jeopardize his security clearance. Id. at 184. I was impressed with the mother’s candor as she testified. It was apparent to me that the mother’s testimony was spontaneous and unrehearsed; I found the individual’s mother to be a woman of integrity. In the end, the individual’s mother convinced me that she will not be a source of coercion for the individual in the future.

In addition, I also questioned the individual about other potential sources of possible coercion, exploitation, or duress, i.e., loved ones living in a foreign country. The individual provided extensive, credible testimony to address this compelling security concern. He convinced me that he will take the necessary steps to avoid being coerced again. At the hearing, I posed hypothetical questions to the individual to discern how he might act in the future if he is confronted with a situation that might tempt him to act contrary to the national security. He testified convincingly that he would emphatically refuse to do anything to compromise national security if requested to do so by a loved one living in the foreign country at issue. Id. at 232, 236. He reaffirmed that he will never again make the same mistake in judgment by providing false information to the DOE. Id. at 228-230, Response to Notification Letter.

Fifth, after carefully observing the individual’s demeanor at the hearing, it is my opinion that the individual fully understands the seriousness of his falsifications and is taking responsibility for actions. Acknowledging wrongdoing and taking full responsibility for one’s actions are important and necessary steps in the process of reformation. While not automatically dispositive of security concern issues, taking responsibility for one’s actions, coupled with a subsequent pattern of honesty and responsible behavior, can abate security concerns. As for whether the individual has comported himself in an honest and responsible manner since he admitted his falsifications eighteen months ago, I was impressed by the testimony of two of the individual’s supervisors who have observed the individual’s actions on a day-to-day basis. One supervisor testified that after the individual’s clearance was suspended, the individual made sure that no one discussed classified information in his presence and advised those present that he was not authorized to hear classified information due to the status of his suspended security clearance. Id. at 73. That same supervisor related that since the suspension of the individual’s security clearance, the individual has remained diligent and continued to comport himself in an honest and forthright manner. Id. at 74-76. Another supervisor attested that he and the individual’s peers believe the individual sets an example for handling sensitive information with the greatest of care and concern for inappropriate disclosure. Id. at 139. Furthermore, the individual testified credibly that he is committed to abiding by “all the DOE rules and regulations that I have so dearly cherished in my other responsibilities,” a sentiment that appears to demonstrate his conviction to remain honest in all facets of his life that could potentially have ramifications for national security. Id.at 198. Finally, during the administrative hearing process, I was impressed by the individual’s attempt to be totally forthright and candid with respect to all details relating to the facts and circumstances surrounding the foreign passport at issue. During one of the two status telephone conferences I convened in this case, the individual expressed concern that he may not have accurately characterized the reason why a passport was required to address the inheritance issues in the foreign country. While the detail at issue ultimately proved not to be relevant to the falsification at issue, the individual’s actions suggested to me that he was exercising great care to provide an accurate and full accounting of all the facts conceivably relevant to the case.

With regard to whether eighteen months of responsible, honest behavior is sufficient to evidence reformation from two isolated incidents of dishonesty that spanned six months in duration, I believe this determination is a close call. In deciding that the individual has presented sufficient evidence of reformation, I accorded much weight to his attitude towards security. Unlike some cases where I have served as Hearing Officer during the last seven years, the individual sincerely expressed remorse for his falsifications, convincingly testified to his commitment to comply with security rules and regulations in the future and vowed never to repeat any similar actions again. Beyond evaluating the individual’s testimony at the hearing, I assessed the individual’s credibility by observing his demeanor and observing his interaction with witnesses. In the end, every personnel security case is unique and must be judged on its own merits. In this case, based on the individual’s testimony and that of the individual’s supervisors and colleagues, I find that the individual’s behavior subsequent to his self-disclosure is indicative that he intends to comport himself in an honest and upright fashion. Moreover, his honest behavior during the pendency of this administrative hearing leads me to conclude that the individual is a man of candor, notwithstanding the falsifications at issue in this proceeding. The fact that the record indicates that the individual has had 18 months of responsible, honest behavior since the time of his dishonesty only reaffirms the conviction in my mind. Cf. Personnel Security Hearing, 27 DOE ¶ 82,823 (1999), aff’d, 27 DOE ¶ 83,025 (2000)(affirmed by OSA, 2000)(as Hearing Officer, I decided that 19 months was not sufficient time to demonstrate rehabilitation for a 12-year period of deception).

In the final analysis, I am called upon to decide whether the individual has demonstrated that restoring his access authorization is clearly consistent with the national interest. After due deliberation which included carefully weighing all the evidence, both favorable and unfavorable, (9) it is my common-sense judgment that the individual’s access authorization should be restored. I find that such restoration would not endanger the common defense and security and would be clearly consistent with the national interest. 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(a).

V. Conclusion

As explained in this Opinion, I find that the DOE properly invoked 10 C.F.R. § 710.8(f) in suspending the individual's access authorization. After carefully considering and weighing all the evidence in this case, I find that restoring the individual’s access authorization would not endanger the common defense and security and would be clearly consistent with the national interest.

The regulations set forth at 10 C.F.R. § 710.28(a) provide that either the Office of Security Affairs or the individual may file a request for review of this Hearing Officer's Opinion within 30 calendar days of receipt of the Opinion. Any such request must be filed with the Director, Office of Hearings and Appeals, 1000 Independence Ave., S.W., Washington, D.C. 20585-0107, and served on the other party. The party seeking review of the Opinion must file a statement identifying the issues that it wishes to contest within 15 calendar days after the party files its request for review. The party seeking review must serve a copy of its statement on the other party, who may file a response within 20 days of receipt of the statement. 10 C.F.R. § 710.28(b). Submissions must be served on the

Office of Security Affairs at the following address:

Director

Office of Safeguards and Security, SO-21

Office of Security Affairs

U. S. Department of Energy

19901 Germantown Road

Germantown, MD 20874

Ann S. Augustyn

Hearing Officer

Office of Hearings and Appeals

Date: July 9, 2001

(1)Access authorization is defined as an administrative determination that an individual is eligible for access to classified matter or is eligible for access to, or control over, special nuclear material. 10 C.F.R. § 710.5(a). Such authorization will be referred to from time to time in this Opinion as access authorization or security clearance.

(2)Criterion F concerns information that a person has “[d]eliberately misrepresented, falsified, or omitted significant information from a Personnel Security Questionnaire, a Questionnaire for Sensitive Positions, a personnel qualifications statement , a personnel security interview, written or oral statements made in response to official inquiry on a matter that is relevant to a determination regarding eligibility for DOE access authorization, or proceedings conducted pursuant to § 710.20 through § 710.31.” 10 C.F.R. § 710.8(f).

(3)The individual’s father died in November 1996. Response to Notification Letter at 1. The individual’s mother could not access any of her deceased husband’s assets in the foreign country where she lived at the time and where her husband had died, unless her children abandoned their interest in their father’s estate. Tr. at 156-60. Personnel in various agencies in the foreign country at issue advised the individual’s mother that she might be able to settle her husband’s estate and gain access to his frozen assets if her children applied for a passport from the foreign country. Id. at 161-164. The asserted purpose of the individual having a passport issued from the foreign country at issue was twofold: to evidence in the native language of the foreign country that the individual was his father’s son, and to permit the individual to abandon his interest in his father’s estate. Id.

(4)The DOE does not allege that the individual’s possession of a foreign passport constituted a separate security concern in this case.

(5)The factors enumerated in 10 C.F.R. § 710.7(c) include the following: the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct, the circumstances surrounding his conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; the frequency and recency of his conduct; the age and maturity at the time of the conduct; the voluntariness of his participation; the absence or presence of rehabilitation or reformation and other pertinent behavioral changes; the motivation for his conduct; the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress, the likelihood of continuation or recurrence; and other relevant and material factors.

(6)With regard to the individual’s testimony that he falsified his response to Question 17(d) on the QNSP, in part, because he believed that the foreign passport was not “active,” I believed the individual’s testimony that he never intended to use the passport as an indication of his citizenship of or allegiance to the foreign country, to travel to any location, or for any other personal benefit. However, if the individual was unsure what the term “active” passport meant, he should have inquired further about the matter prior to completing the forms, or at least sought clarification from the OPM investigator when he met with her to review the QNSP. Moreover, the individual himself recognizes that he rationalized his lying by interpreting the question in a way designed to conceal his possession of the passport. Tr. at 210. In the end, I cannot conclude that the individual’s semantic justification for his falsifications is a factor in his favor.

(7)Regarding the issue of the promptness of the individual’s self-disclosure, I find only that the individual promptly corrected his falsehood to the OPM investigator because he acted within five calendar days and two business days after reaffirming his incorrect response on the QNSP. See Ex. B (calendar showing November 13 and 14 were weekend days) (judicial notice that November 12 was celebrated as a federal holiday, Veteran’s Day). The correction of the misinformation on the QNSP, coming six months after the individual executed the form, cannot be considered prompt action, however.

(8)In a post-hearing submission, the DOE confirmed that OPM could not have discerned on its own that the individual held a passport issued by the foreign country at issue. See Letter from the DOE Counsel to the Hearing Officer and the individual (June 8, 2001).

(9)The Part 710 regulations prohibit me from considering the effect of the loss of the individual’s access authorization on the mission of the DOE. 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(b). Accordingly, I have not given any weight in this Opinion to the testimonial accounts of the individual’s technical competence and professional contributions to the DOE and other agencies.