[Code of Federal Regulations]
[Title 10, Volume 4]
[Revised as of January 1, 2002]
From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access
[CITE: 10CFR710.36]
[Page 304-312]
TITLE 10--ENERGY
CHAPTER III--DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
PART 710--CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED MATTER OR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL--Table of Contents
Subpart A--General Criteria and Procedures for Determining Eligibility
for Access to Classified Matter or Special Nuclear Material
Sec. 710.36 Acting officials.
Except for the Secretary, the responsibilities and authorities
conferred in this subpart may be exercised by persons who have been
designated in writing as acting for, or in the temporary capacity of,
the following DOE positions: The Local Director of Security, the
Manager, the Director, Office of Safeguards and Security, or the General
Counsel. The responsibilities and authorities of the Director, Office of
Security Affairs, may be exercised in his absence only by the Deputy
Director, Office of Security Affairs.
[66 FR 47067, Sept. 11, 2001]
[[Page 305]]
Appendix A to Subpart A of Part 710--Selected Provisions of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as Amended, Sec. 141 (42 U.S.C. 2161), Sec. 145 (42
U.S.C. 2165), Sec. 161 (42 U.S.C. 2201)
(By authority of the Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C.
7151(a), the Secretary of Energy or her designated representative is to
be substituted for the ``Commission'' and ``General Manager'' as
appropriate.)
Sec. 141. Policy. It shall be the policy of the Commission to
control the dissemination and declassification of Restricted Data in
such a manner as to assure the common defense and security. * * *
Sec. 145. Restriction. (a) No arrangement shall be made under
section 31, no contract shall be made or continued in effect under
section 141, and no license shall be issued under section 103 or 104,
unless the person with whom such arrangement is made, the contractor or
prospective contractor, or the prospective licensee agrees in writing
not to permit any individual to have access to Restricted Data until the
Civil Service Commission shall have made an investigation and report to
the Commission on the character, associations, and loyalty of such
individual, and the Commission shall have determined that permitting
such person to have access to Restricted Data will not endanger the
common defense and security.
(b) Except as authorized by the Commission or the General Manager
upon a determination by the Commission or General Manager that such
action is clearly consistent with the national interest, no individual
shall be employed by the Commission nor shall the Commission permit any
individual to have access to Restricted Data until the Civil Service
Commission shall have made an investigation and report to the Commission
on the character, associations, and loyalty of such individual, and the
Commission shall have determined that permitting such person to have
access to Restricted Data will not endanger the common defense and
security.
(c) In lieu of the investigation and report to be made by the Civil
Service Commission pursuant to subsection (b) of this appendix, the
Commission may accept an investigation and report on the character,
associations, and loyalty of an individual made by another Government
agency which conducts personnel security investigations, provided that a
security clearance has been granted to such individual by another
Government agency based on such investigation and report.
(d) In the event an investigation made pursuant to subsections (a)
and (b) of this appendix develops any data reflecting that the
individual who is the subject of the investigation is of questionable
loyalty, the Civil Service Commission shall refer the matter to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation for the conduct of a full field
investigation, the results of which shall be furnished to the Civil
Service Commission for its information and appropriate action.
(e) If the President deems it to be in the national interest he may
from time to time determine that investigations of any group or class
which are required by subsections (a), (b), and (c) of this appendix be
made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(f) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a), (b), and (c)
of this appendix, a majority of the members of the Commission shall
certify those specific positions which are of a high degree of
importance or sensitivity, and upon such certification, the
investigation and reports required by such provisions shall be made by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(g) The Commission shall establish standards and specifications in
writing as to the scope and extent of investigations, the reports of
which will be utilized by the Commission in making the determination,
pursuant to subsections (a), (b), and (c) of this appendix, that
permitting a person access to Restricted Data will not endanger the
common defense and security. Such standards and specifications shall be
based on the location and class or kind of work to be done, and shall,
among other considerations, take into account the degree of importance
to the common defense and security of the Restricted Data to which
access will be permitted.
(h) Whenever the Congress declares that a state of war exists, or in
the event of a national disaster due to enemy attack, the Commission is
authorized during the state of war or period of national disaster due to
enemy attack to employ individuals and to permit individuals access to
Restricted Data pending the investigation report, and determination
required by section 145b, to the extent that and so long as the
Commission finds that such action is required to prevent impairment of
its activities in furtherance of the common defense and security.
Sec. 161. General provisions. In the performance of its functions
the Commission is authorized to:
(a) Establish advisory boards to advise with and make
recommendations to the Commission on legislation, policies,
administration, research, and other matters, provided that the
Commission issues regulations setting forth the scope, procedure, and
limitations of the authority of each such board;
(b) Establish by rule, regulation, or order, such standards and
instructions to govern
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the possession and use of special nuclear material, source material, and
byproduct material as the Commission may deem necessary or desirable to
promote the common defense and security or to protect health or to
minimize danger to life or property;
(c) Make such studies and investigations, obtain such information,
and hold such meetings or hearings as the Commission may deem necessary
or proper to assist it in exercising any authority provided in this
chapter, or in the administration or enforcement of this Act, or any
regulations or orders issued thereunder. For such purposes the
Commission is authorized to administer oaths and affirmations, and by
subpoena to require any person to appear and testify, or to appear and
produce documents, or both, at any designated place. Witnesses
subpoenaed under this subsection, shall be paid the same fees and
mileage as are paid witnesses in the district courts of the United
States.
* * * * *
(i) Prescribe such regulations or orders as it may deem necessary
(1) to protect Restricted Data received by any person in connection with
any activity authorized pursuant to this Act, (2) to guard against the
loss or diversion of any special nuclear material acquired by any person
pursuant to section 53 or produced by any person in connection with any
activity authorized pursuant to the Act, to prevent any use or
disposition thereof which the Commission may determine to be inimical to
the common defense and security, including regulations or orders
designating activities, involving quantities of special nuclear material
which in the opinion of the Commission are important to the common
defense and security, that may be conducted only by persons whose
character, associations, and loyalty shall have been investigated under
standards and specifications established by the Commission and as to
whom the Commission shall have determined that permitting each such
person to conduct the activity will not be inimical to the common
defense and security, and (3) to govern any activity authorized pursuant
to this Act, including standards and restrictions governing the design,
location, and operation of facilities used in the conduct of such
activity, in order to protect health and to minimize danger to life or
property;
* * * * *
(n) Delegate to the General Manager or other officers of the
Commission any of those functions assigned to it under this Act except
those specified in sections 51, 57b, 61, 108, 123, 145b (with respect to
the determination of those persons to whom the Commission may reveal
Restricted Data in the national interest), 145f, and 161a;
* * * * *
(p) Make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Appendix B to Subpart A of Part 710--Adjudicative Guidelines Approved by
the President in Accordance With the Provisions of Executive Order 12968
(The following guidelines, included in this subpart for reference
purposes only, are reproduced as provided to the DOE by the Security
Policy Board. The President may change the guidelines without notice.)
Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to
Classified Information
1. Introduction. The following adjudicative guidelines are
established for all U.S. government civilian and military personnel,
consultants, contractors, employees of contractors, licensees,
certificate holders or grantees and their employees and other
individuals who require access to classified information. They apply to
persons being considered for initial or continued eligibility for access
to classified information, to include sensitive compartmented
information and special access programs and are to be used by government
departments and agencies in all final clearance determinations.
2. The Adjudicative Process.
(a) The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient
period of a person's life to make an affirmative determination that the
person is eligible for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to
classified information is predicated upon the individual meeting these
personnel security guidelines. The adjudicative process is the careful
weighing of a number of variables known as the whole person concept.
Available, reliable information about the person, past and present,
favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a
determination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct,
the adjudicator should consider the following factors:
(1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
(2) The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include
knowledgeable participation;
(3) The frequency and recency of the conduct;
(4) The individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
(5) The voluntariness of participation;
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(6) The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent
behavioral changes;
(7) The motivation for the conduct;
(8) The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress;
and
(9) The likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
(b) Each case must be judged on its own merits, and final
determination remains the responsibility of the specific department or
agency. Any doubt as to whether access to classified information is
clearly consistent with national security will be resolved in favor of
the national security.
(c) The ultimate determination of whether the granting or continuing
of eligibility for a security clearance is clearly consistent with the
interests of national security must be an overall common sense
determination based upon careful consideration of the following, each of
which is to be evaluated in the context of the whole person concept, as
explained further below:
(1) Guideline A: Allegiance to the United States;
(2) Guideline B: Foreign influence;
(3) Guideline C: Foreign preference;
(4) Guideline D: Sexual behavior;
(5) Guideline E: Personal conduct;
(6) Guideline F: Financial considerations;
(7) Guideline G: Alcohol consumption;
(8) Guideline H: Drug involvement;
(9) Guideline I: Emotional, mental, and personality disorders;
(10) Guideline J: Criminal Conduct;
(11) Guideline K: Security violations;
(12) Guideline L: Outside activities;
(13) Guideline M: Misuse of Information Technology Systems.
(d) Although adverse information concerning a single criterion may
not be sufficient for an unfavorable determination, the individual may
be disqualified if available information reflects a recent or recurring
pattern of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotionally
unstable behavior. Notwithstanding, the whole person concept, pursuit of
further investigation may be terminated by an appropriate adjudicative
agency in the face of reliable, significant, disqualifying, adverse
information.
(e) When information of security concern becomes known about an
individual who is currently eligible for access to classified
information, the adjudicator should consider whether the person:
(1) Voluntarily reported the information;
(2) Was truthful and complete in responding to questions;
(3) Sought assistance and followed professional guidance, where
appropriate;
(4) Resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security
concern;
(5) Has demonstrated positive changes in behavior and employment;
(6) Should have his or her access temporarily suspended pending
final adjudication of the information.
(f) If after evaluating information of security concern, the
adjudicator decides that the information is not serious enough to
warrant a recommendation of disapproval or revocation of the security
clearance, it may be appropriate to recommend approval with a warning
that future incidents of a similar nature may result in revocation of
access.
Guideline A: Allegiance to the United States
3. The Concern. An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance to
the United States. The willingness to safeguard classified information
is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an individual's allegiance
to the United States.
4. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) Involvement in any act of sabotage, espionage, treason,
terrorism, sedition, or other act whose aim is to overthrow the
Government of the United States or alter the form of government by
unconstitutional means;
(b) Association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to
commit, or who are committing, any of the above acts;
(c) Association or sympathy with persons or organizations that
advocate the overthrow of the United States Government, or any state or
subdivision, by force or violence or by other unconstitutional means;
(d) Involvement in activities which unlawfully advocate or practice
the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from
exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United
States or of any state.
5. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) The individual was unaware of the unlawful aims of the
individual or organization and severed ties upon learning of these;
(b) The individual's involvement was only with the lawful or
humanitarian aspects of such an organization;
(c) Involvement in the above activities occurred for only a short
period of time and was attributable to curiosity or academic interest;
(d) The person has had no recent involvement or association with
such activities.
Guideline B: Foreign Influence
6. The Concern. A security risk may exist when an individual's
immediate family, including cohabitants and other persons to whom he or
she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens
of
[[Page 308]]
the United States or may be subject to duress. These situations could
create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the
compromise of classified information. Contacts with citizens of other
countries or financial interests in other countries are also relevant to
security determinations if they make an individual potentially
vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.
7. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) An immediate family member, or a person to whom the individual
has close ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of, or resident
or present in, a foreign country.
(b) Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of
their citizenship status, if the potential for adverse foreign influence
or duress exists;
(c) Relatives, cohabitants, or associates who are connected with any
foreign country;
(d) Failing to report, where required, associations with foreign
nationals;
(e) Unauthorized association with a suspected or known collaborator
or employee of a foreign intelligence service;
(f) Conduct which may make the individual vulnerable to coercion,
exploitation, or pressure by a foreign government;
(g) Indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign
country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to
possible future exploitation, coercion or pressure;
(h) A substantial financial interest in a country, or in any foreign
owned or operated business that could make the individual vulnerable to
foreign influence.
8. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) A determination that the immediate family member(s) (spouse,
father, mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters), cohabitant, or
associate(s) in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a
position to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force
the individual to choose between loyalty to the person(s) involved and
the United States;
(b) Contacts with foreign citizens are the result of official United
States Government business;
(c) Contact and correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and
infrequent;
(d) The individual has promptly complied with existing agency
requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats
from persons or organizations from a foreign country;
(e) Foreign financial interests are minimal and not sufficient to
affect the individual's security responsibilities.
Guideline C: Foreign Preference
9. The Concern. When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate
a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or
she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are
harmful to the interests of the United States.
10. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) The exercise of dual citizenship;
(b) Possession and/or use of a foreign passport;
(c) Military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign
country;
(d) Accepting educational, medical, or other benefits, such as
retirement and social welfare, from a foreign country;
(e) Residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements;
(f) Using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business
interests in another country;
(g) Seeking or holding political office in the foreign country;
(h) Voting in foreign elections; and
(i) Performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting,
so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the
interests of the United States.
11. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) Dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or
birth in a foreign country;
(b) Indicators of possible foreign preference (e.g., foreign
military service) occurred before obtaining United States citizenship;
(c) Activity is sanctioned by the United States;
(d) Individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual
citizenship.
Guideline D: Sexual Behavior
12. The Concern. Sexual behavior is a security concern if it
involves a criminal offense, indicates a personality or emotional
disorder, may subject the individual to coercion, exploitation, or
duress, or reflects lack of judgment or discretion. (The adjudicator
should also consider guidelines pertaining to criminal conduct
(Guideline J) and emotional, mental, and personality disorders
(Guideline I) in determining how to resolve the security concerns raised
by sexual behavior.) Sexual orientation or preference may not be used as
a basis for a disqualifying factor in determining a person's eligibility
for a security clearance.
13. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) Sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the
individual has been prosecuted;
(b) Compulsive or addictive sexual behavior when the person is
unable to stop a pattern of self-destructive high-risk behavior or that
which is symptomatic of a personality disorder;
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(c) Sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to
coercion, exploitation, or duress;
(d) Sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that which reflects
lack of discretion or judgment.
14. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) The behavior occurred during or prior to adolescence and there
is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
(b) The behavior was not recent and there is no evidence of
subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
(c) There is no other evidence of questionable judgment,
irresponsibility, or emotional instability;
(d) The behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion,
exploitation, or duress.
Guideline E: Personal Conduct
15. The Concern. Conduct involving questionable judgment,
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations could indicate that
the person may not properly safeguard classified information. The
following will normally result in an unfavorable clearance action or
administrative termination of further processing for clearance
eligibility:
(a) Refusal to undergo or cooperate with required security
processing, including medical and psychological testing; or
(b) Refusal to complete required security forms, releases, or
provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful questions of
investigators, security officials or other official representatives in
connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination.
16. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying also include:
(a) Reliable, unfavorable information provided by associates,
employers, coworkers, neighbors, and other acquaintances;
(b) The deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of
relevant and material facts from any personnel security questionnaire,
personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct
investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or
status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or
award fiduciary responsibilities;
(c) Deliberately providing false or misleading information
concerning relevant and material matters to an investigator, security
official, competent medical authority, or other official representative
in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness
determination.
(d) Personal conduct or concealment of information that may increase
an individual's vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duress, such
as engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's
personal, professional, or community standing or render the person
susceptible to blackmail;
(e) A pattern of dishonesty or rule violations, including violation
of any written or recorded agreement made between the individual and the
agency;
(f) Association with persons involved in criminal activity.
17. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) The information was unsubstantiated or not pertinent to a
determination of judgment, trustworthiness, or reliability;
(b) The falsification was an isolated incident, was not recent, and
the individual has subsequently provided correct information
voluntarily;
(c) The individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the
falsification before being confronted with the facts;
(d) Omission of material facts was caused or significantly
contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of authorized personnel,
and the previously omitted information was promptly and fully provided;
(e) The individual has taken positive steps to significantly reduce
or eliminate vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duress;
(f) A refusal to cooperate was based on advice from legal counsel or
other officials that the individual was not required to comply with
security processing requirements and, upon being made aware of the
requirement, fully and truthfully provided the requested information;
(g) Association with persons involved in criminal activities has
ceased.
Guideline F: Financial Considerations
18. The Concern. An individual who is financially overextended is at
risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. Unexplained
affluence is often linked to proceeds from financially profitable
criminal acts.
19. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) A history of not meeting financial obligations;
(b) Deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement,
employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud,
filing deceptive loan statements, and other intentional financial
breaches of trust;
(c) Inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;
(d) Unexplained affluence;
(e) Financial problems that are linked to gambling, drug abuse,
alcoholism, or other issues of security concern.
20. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) The behavior was not recent;
(b) It was an isolated incident;
(c) The conditions that resulted in the behavior were largely beyond
the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business
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downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or
separation);
(d) The person has received or is receiving counseling for the
problem and there are clear indications that the problem is being
resolved or is under control;
(e) The affluence resulted from a legal source; and
(f) The individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue
creditors or otherwise resolve debts.
Guideline G: Alcohol Consumption
21. The Concern. Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the
exercise of questionable judgment, unreliability, failure to control
impulses, and increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of
classified information due to carelessness.
22. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) Alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while
under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, or other criminal
incidents related to alcohol use;
(b) Alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work or
duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the job;
(c) Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g.,
physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of alcohol abuse or
alcohol dependence;
(d) Evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a licensed
clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol
treatment program;
(e) Habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of
impaired judgment;
(f) Consumption of alcohol, subsequent to a diagnosis of alcoholism
by a credentialed medical professional and following completion of an
alcohol rehabilitation program.
23. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) The alcohol related incidents do not indicate a pattern;
(b) The problem occurred a number of years ago and there is no
indication of a recent problem;
(c) Positive changes in behavior supportive of sobriety;
(d) Following diagnosis of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence, the
individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient
rehabilitation along with aftercare requirements, participated
frequently in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar
organization, has abstained from alcohol for a period of at least 12
months, and received a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical
professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member
of a recognized alcohol treatment program.
Guideline H: Drug Involvement
24. The Concern.
(a) Improper or illegal involvement with drugs raises questions
regarding an individual's willingness or ability to protect classified
information. Drug abuse or dependence may impair social or occupational
functioning, increasing the risk of an unauthorized disclosure of
classified information.
(b) Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering substances and
include: (1) Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified
and listed in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g.,
marijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and
hallucinogens), and (2) inhalants and other similar substances.
(c) Drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug
in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.
25. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) Any drug abuse (see above definition);
(b) Illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing,
manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution;
(c) Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g.,
physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug abuse or drug
dependence;
(d) Evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed
clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized drug
treatment program;
(e) Failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program
prescribed by a credentialed medical professional. Recent drug
involvement, especially following the granting of a security clearance,
or an expressed intent not to discontinue use, will almost invariably
result in an unfavorable determination.
26. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) The drug involvement was not recent;
(b) The drug involvement was an isolated or aberrational event;
(c) A demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future;
(d) Satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program,
including rehabilitation and aftercare requirements, without recurrence
of abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical
professional.
Guideline I: Emotional, Mental, and Personality Disorders
27. The Concern. Emotional, mental, and personality disorders can
cause a significant defect in an individual's psychological, social and
occupational functioning. These disorders are of security concern
because they may indicate a defect in judgment, reliability, or
stability. A credentialed mental
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health professional (e.g., clinical psychologist or psychiatrist),
employed by, acceptable to or approved by the government, should be
utilized in evaluating potentially disqualifying and mitigating
information fully and properly, and particularly for consultation with
the individual's mental health care provider.
28. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) An opinion by a credentialed mental health professional that the
individual has a condition or treatment that may indicate a defect in
judgment, reliability, or stability;
(b) Information that suggests that an individual has failed to
follow appropriate medical advice relating to treatment of a condition,
e.g., failure to take prescribed medication;
(c) A pattern of high-risk, irresponsible, aggressive, anti-social
or emotionally unstable behavior;
(d) Information that suggests that the individual's current behavior
indicates a defect in his or her judgment or reliability.
29. Conditions that could mitigate security clearance concerns
include:
(a) There is no indication of a current problem;
(b) Recent opinion by a credentialed mental health professional that
an individual's previous emotional, mental, or personality disorder is
cured, under control or in remission and has a low probability of
recurrence or exacerbation;
(c) The past emotional instability was a temporary condition (e.g.,
one caused by a death, illness, or marital breakup), the situation has
been resolved, and the individual is no longer emotionally unstable.
Guideline J: Criminal Conduct
30. The Concern. A history or pattern of criminal activity creates a
doubt about a person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.
31. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) Allegations or admissions of criminal conduct, regardless of
whether the person was formally charged;
(b) A single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses.
32. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) The criminal behavior was not recent;
(b) The crime was an isolated incident;
(c) The person was pressured or coerced into committing the act and
those pressures are no longer present in that person's life;
(d) The person did not voluntarily commit the act and/or the factors
leading to the violation are not likely to recur;
(e) Acquittal;
(f) There is clear evidence of successful rehabilitation.
Guideline K: Security Violations
33. The Concern. Noncompliance with security regulations raises
doubt about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to
safeguard classified information.
34. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) Unauthorized disclosure of classified information;
(b) Violations that are deliberate or multiple or due to negligence.
35. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include actions
that:
(a) Were inadvertent;
(b) Were isolated or infrequent;
(c) Were due to improper or inadequate training;
(d) Demonstrate a positive attitude towards the discharge of
security responsibilities.
Guideline L: Outside Activities
36. The Concern. Involvement in certain types of outside employment
or activities is of security concern if it poses a conflict with an
individual's security responsibilities and could create an increased
risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
37. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include any service, whether compensated, volunteer, or
employment with:
(a) A foreign country;
(b) Any foreign national;
(c) A representative of any foreign interest;
(d) Any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person
engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on
intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology.
38. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) Evaluation of the outside employment or activity indicates that
it does not pose a conflict with an individual's security
responsibilities;
(b) The individual terminates employment or discontinues the
activity upon being notified that it is in conflict with his or her
security responsibilities.
Guideline M: Misuse of Information Technology Systems
39. The Concern. Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines,
or regulations pertaining to information technology systems may raise
security concerns about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness,
and ability to properly protect classified systems, networks, and
information. Information Technology Systems include all related
equipment used for the communication, transmission, processing,
manipulation, and storage of classified or sensitive information.
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40. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying include:
(a) Illegal or unauthorized entry into any information technology
system;
(b) Illegal or unauthorized modification destruction, manipulation
or denial of access to information residing on an information technology
system;
(c) Removal (or use) of hardware, software, or media from any
information technology system without authorization, when specifically
prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations;
(d) Introduction of hardware, software, or media into any
information technology system without authorization, when specifically
prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations.
41. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) The misuse was not recent or significant;
(b) The conduct was unintentional or inadvertent;
(c) The introduction or removal of media was authorized;
(d) The misuse was an isolated event;
(e) The misuse was followed by a prompt, good faith effort to
correct the situation.
[66 FR 47067, Sept. 11, 2001]